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180 Abstract
In this paper, we provide the first analysis of the level and determinants of sover-
eign exposure of banking systems in Central and Eastern European (CEE) coun-
tries, thus contributing to the existing literature on sovereign exposures and the 
sovereign-bank nexus. Results of descriptive analysis showed that exposure to 
sovereign debt securities in CEE countries is substantially higher than in euro 
area countries, which can be explained by the lower development of financial 
markets in this region. We also found evidence of home-bias in CEE and empha-
sized the role of different monetary policy regimes in explaining differences in 
exposure among CEE countries. Results of panel analysis showed that changes of 
debt securities in bank balance sheets in CEE countries are mostly determined by 
broader macroeconomic conditions and to a lesser extent by their regulatory 
frameworks. In addition, we did not find evidence of so-called reach-for-yield 
behaviour. Our results indicate that efforts to reduce sovereign exposure in CEE 
countries require strong collaboration of not only regulators, but also of fiscal 
authorities and other policy makers able to contribute to the development of 
financial markets in this region. Moreover, regulators should especially focus on 
reducing the home-bias in CEE. 
Keywords: sovereign-bank nexus, banks’ exposure to sovereign debt, CEE, panel 
regressions
1 INTRODUCTION
The European sovereign debt crisis, triggered by the global financial shock of 
2008, exposed the strong links between European banks and governments, which 
became known popularly as the “sovereign-bank nexus”. 
The sovereign-bank nexus operates through various channels. According to 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018), banks hold large amounts of sovereign debt on their bal-
ance sheets so they are not only directly exposed to sovereign risk but also play an 
important role in financing government needs. Next, an increase in sovereign risk 
lowers the government’s ability to assist the banking system if it runs into trouble, 
thereby hurting banks, while on the other hand, banking crises lead to costly resolu-
tion policies with negative effects on fiscal balances. Finally, increases in sovereign 
risk have contractionary effects on economic activity and can lead to losses and 
weakening of banks’ capital position, which negatively affects banking system sta-
bility. Regardless of the channel, countries the banking systems of which have 
greater exposure to sovereign debt a have higher risk of the negative “doom loop” 
between bank risk and sovereign risk (Alogoskoufis and Langfield, 2018). 
Thus, the problem of bank exposure to sovereign debt has come to the top of the 
agenda for European policy makers and regulators in recent years. Regulation 
(EU) no 575/2013 brought important changes in the treatment of sovereign debt 
securities in bank balance sheets as, according to this new regulation, risk weight 
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181In 2015 the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) published a detailed analysis 
and discussion of the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures (ESRB, 2015). 
In 2017 the European Parliament intensively discussed the proposal of regulatory 
disincentives against highly concentrated sovereign exposures of the euro area 
banking system in 2017 (Veron, 2017). Also, as Veron (2017) and Gros and de 
Groen (2018) stress, reduction of sovereign exposure in banks is one of the key 
elements and goals of the Banking Union. Therefore, although there is still no 
consensus on the new regulatory framework, we can expect that the completion of 
the Banking Union will bring various regulations and a mechanism aimed at 
breaking the bank-sovereign vicious circle (Schnabel and Veron, 2018).
Problems of sovereign exposure and the sovereign-bank nexus have also attracted 
the attention of the academic community. The research papers that address these 
problems have grown rapidly in number in the past decade, especially focusing on 
the euro area as a whole or periphery countries (e.g. De Bruyckere et al, 2013; 
Battistini, Pagano and Simonelli, 2014; Schnabel and Schüwer, 2017; Gomez-
Puig, Singh and Rivero, 2019). 
However, to our knowledge, there is no research concentrating on Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries, although the exposure of banks in the CEE 
region to sovereign debt is substantially higher than in most other EU and euro 
area countries. In addition, current discussions on sovereign exposures in the euro 
area will become even more relevant for those CEE countries that are preparing to 
join the ERM II and the euro area in the near future1. In this paper we seek to fill 
this gap in the literature by analysing the degree of exposure of banking systems 
in CEE to sovereign debt and by investigating the main determinants of banks’ 
appetite for sovereign debt securities in this region. 
This paper addresses two main research questions. First, why are banks in the 
CEE region more exposed to sovereign debt than euro area countries? Second, 
which theories of bank behaviour can explain the motivation for banks in the CEE 
region to accumulate sovereign debt in their balance sheets? These questions have 
not yet been posted in the literature. Besides the fact that this paper represents 
some pioneering research on banks’ exposure to sovereign debt in CEE countries, 
we also contribute to the literature by expanding the set of potential explanatory 
variables of bank exposure to sovereign debt and by focusing on macro-level anal-
ysis, while most previous research has been based on bank-level micro data.
The following section presents a brief overview of factors that affect banks’ appe-
tite for sovereign debt securities. The third section provides an exploration of the 
level of bank balance sheet exposures to sovereign debt in CEE countries. The 
fourth section presents data and methodology, while the fifth provides discussion 
1 Bulgaria and Croatia have each sent a letter on participation in ERM II, while Romania has prepared the 
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182 of the empirical results. The paper ends with conclusions, based on descriptive 
analysis and econometric results.
2 WHY WOULD BANKS WANT TO HOLD SOVEREIGN DEBT SECURITIES?
Governments can borrow funds through various instruments, such as loans pro-
vided by local banks, bonds issued on the domestic bond market, international 
bonds and loans provided by international banking groups (Bajo, Primorac and 
Andabaka Badurina, 2011). In all these cases banks play important roles as they 
directly (by accumulating debt in their balance sheets) or indirectly (e.g. through 
the role of investment banks) finance the increasing financing needs of govern-
ments. However, in this paper we focus only on one instrument, debt securities, as 
the conceptual framework of our analysis is based on the “sovereign-bank nexus” 
that emphasizes the role of debt securities in bank balance sheets. So why would 
banks want to hold sovereign debt securities in their balance sheets?
Firstly, sovereign debt securities represent attractive assets to satisfy bank liquid-
ity requirements, along with other important regulatory liquidity standards. This 
factor implies that banks are motivated to hold government debt due to regulatory 
requirements (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2018). In addition, the Basel Committee stand-
ardized approach to credit risk provides a widely used regulatory exemption that 
allows banks to apply zero risk weight to domestic government bonds in the local 
currency, whatever the sovereign risk, making them more attractive to banks 
(Acharya and Steffen, 2015). Rocamora (2018) refers to the importance of the co-
called “flight to safety” effect that occurs when banks increase their preference for 
risk-free assets during times of crisis. Sovereign debt securities are also often used 
as collateral and are used in central bank open market operations (Brutti and 
Sauré, 2016). Similarly, Horváth, Huizinga and Ioannidou (2015) draw attention 
to cases in which central banks “create” additional demand for government bonds 
by accepting certain types of bonds as collateral for repo operations. Next, weak 
institutions and poor enforcement of creditor rights hamper the supply of financial 
assets by the private sector, so government debt may provide a store of liquidity to 
transfer idle resources to future use Dell’Ariccia et al., 2018). In addition, banks 
may hold debt securities as a part of an opportunistic strategy or so-called reach-
for-yield behaviour (Altavilla, Pagano and Simonelli, 2016; Lamas and Mencia, 
2018). Similarly, ESRB (2015) indicates that banks can also engage in carry trades 
during crises, meaning that they borrow at relatively low interest rates in the cap-
ital market of non-stressed countries to invest in the comparatively higher-yield-
ing sovereign bonds of stressed countries.
As for other factors, Schnabel and Schüwer (2017) highlight the strong bias of 
banks to local government debt as an important determinant of the level of banks’ 
exposures to government, and this view is also shared by some other authors (Sch-
neider and Steffen, 2017; Dermine, 2018). Moreover, Asonuma, Bakhache and 
Hesse (2015) conclude that such home bias could postpone fiscal consolidation 
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183The collection of literature addressing credit crunches – which in some cases 
might be caused by government borrowing crowding out the private sector – also 
reflects some aspects of banks’ preference for government debt. In this regard, 
Shetta and Kamaly (2014) explore the “lazy bank hypothesis”, which suggests 
that governments with high financing needs discourage banks from granting risk-
ier loans to the private sector in favour of government debt. 
Finally, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018) show that stronger economic growth encour-
ages banks to increase lending to the private sector. On the other hand, in times of 
recession demand for private sector loans could be subdued, which leaves sover-
eign debt as the only investment opportunity for banks. Similarly, ESRB (2015) 
points out that any worsening of macroeconomic and fiscal conditions in some 
countries can lead local banks to absorb more domestic sovereign debt as “buyers 
of last resort” (Gros, 2017), because of moral suasion by governments or for the 
motive of self-preservation (to prevent the sovereign default that could lead to 
systemic crisis). These results indicate that macroeconomic and fiscal conditions 
strongly affect bank behaviour. 
3  SOME STYLIZED FACTS ON BANKS’ EXPOSURE TO SOVEREIGN DEBT  
IN THE CEE REGION
As previously noted, in this paper we focus on debt securities held by local banks 
because the conceptual framework presented in the previous section indicates that 
debt securities are the key concept in the sovereign-bank nexus literature2. How-
ever, before we continue with the analysis it is important to define the concept of 
debt securities. In this paper we use ECB Statistical Warehouse Database (SDW) 
data on debt securities held by banks, which are defined according to ESA 2010 
methodology (AF.3). Local banks can hold both, domestic sovereign securities and 
eligible foreign sovereign securities. We discuss the structure of securities held by 
banks in CEE countries below, but first we start with data on the level of exposure.
In that regard, motivation for this analysis largely came from data presented in 
Figure 1. This figure shows the average share of sovereign debt securities in bank 
total assets in twenty-five members of the European Union (EU)3 in the period 
from 2006 to 20184. The data presented indicate that in most CEE countries there 
are substantially higher shares of sovereign debt securities in banks’ balance 
sheets than there are in other EU countries. Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Poland, 
Slovenia and Czechia are the countries with the highest shares, ranging between 
12% and 17% of total assets. Although the share is somewhat less pronounced in 
Bulgaria (6.6%) and Croatia (7.7%), these countries are still above the median of 
the EU (6% of total assets). The right side of the figure shows that median share 
2 However, to get a complete picture on banks' exposure to sovereign debt one should also include data on 
loans to general government units. In addition, many banks are indirectly exposed to sovereign risk through 
assets of pension funds as banks are usually founders of pension funds.
3 Data for Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia not available.
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184 of debt securities in total assets of banks in CEE countries stands at around 12.5%, 
which is 2.5 times as much as that of the euro area countries (5% of total assets). 
Such differences clearly provoke research interest.
Figure 1









































































































However, although surprising at first, these differences should be interpreted in 
terms of the level of economic development. As pointed out by Gennaioli, Martin 
and Rossi (2018), banks operating in less developed countries tend to have shares 
of government debt in their balance sheets during normal times that are high com-
pared to those in more developed countries. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018) explain that 
less developed countries also tend to have less developed financial markets, which 
limits (private) investment opportunities so sovereign debt securities play impor-
tant role in financial markets. 
Figure 2 shows the relation between level of economic development, measured by 
GDP per capita in PPS (EU 28=100) and the share of sovereign debt securities in 
total assets. Fitted line points to a relatively strong negative relation between the 
level of development and sovereign exposure, in line with the previous discussion. 
This additionally confirms the relevance of our focus on a relatively homogeneous 
group of CEE countries in terms of the level of economic development. The figure 
also indicates that we can identify three “clusters” of countries. The first cluster 
(black fill) includes CEE countries, which are in the focus of this analysis. The 
second cluster (no fill) includes the so-called PIGS countries (acronym for Portu-
gal, Italy, Greece and Spain), Malta and Cyprus, most of which were in the focus 
of previous research (e.g. De Bruyckere et al, 2013; Battistini, Pagano and Simo-
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185as these countries were in the centre of the European debt crisis. The third cluster 
(grey fill) includes most of the developed old-members of the EU, with low shares 
of sovereign debt securities in bank total assets.
Figure 2
Level of development and the share of sovereign debt securities in total assets (%) 























































GDP per capita PPS (EU28=100)
Source: ECB SDW; Eurostat.
Using the fitted line, we can compare the recorded shares of sovereign debt securi-
ties in total assets with the share suggested by the level of economic development. 
In this context, the figure shows that Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Czechia, Poland 
and Romania have excessive shares of debt securities in their balance sheets, while 
the share in Bulgaria and Croatia is below the share suggested by the level of eco-
nomic development. Thus, we can conclude that sovereign exposure in most CEE 
countries is very marked, even after taking into account the level of development. 
It is also interesting to notice that Bulgaria and Croatia have a relatively low share 
of sovereign debt securities in total assets, compared to CEE peers. This can be, at 
least partially explained, by the fact that these countries operate under specific 
monetary policy regimes (peg and quasi-peg) while other CEE countries operate 
under inflation-targeting regimes (IT). The key difference between these mone-
tary policy regimes is that in IT regimes sovereign debt securities play one of the 
key roles in the monetary policy transmission mechanism as eligible securities in 
repo operations that are usually a dominant monetary policy instrument in IT 
countries. On the other hand, in (quasi-)peg countries the key policy instruments 
are foreign exchange interventions, where sovereign debt securities do not play an 
important role. Box plots and mean differences tests presented in the Appendix 
confirm the significant difference in exposure to sovereign debt securities between 
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186 Next, we focus on the dynamics of the share of sovereign debt securities in total 
bank assets in CEE countries from 2006 to 2018. Figure 3 shows that the share of 
sovereign debt securities in total bank assets in the observed period increased in 
most CEE countries, with the strongest rise recorded in Hungary and Romania. In 
most countries the share of debt securities stayed on pronounced levels in the 
post-crisis period, except for Slovenia, Slovakia and Czechia. In these countries 
banks gradually decreased the exposure to sovereign debt. In Slovakia and Slove-
nia, this reduction can be explained by effects of the asset purchases program in 
the euro area launched in 20155. On the other hand, trends in Czechia could be a 
result of the decision made by the Czech National Bank in 2015 to start applying 
an internal methodology for reviewing and evaluating the risk of systemic concen-
tration of sovereign exposures under Pillar 26 (CNB, 2018).
Figure 3















































































































Bulgaria Czech Republic Croatia Hungary
Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia
Source: ECB SDW.
Finally, we turn to the structure of debt securities held by banks in CEE countries as 
the structure of sovereign debt holdings can also give useful information on banks’ 
motives for holding sovereign debt. Figure 4 shows that domestic securities play a 
dominant role in all CEE countries, with the lowest average share of domestic secu-
rities in Croatia and Slovenia standing at the still high 87% and 70%, respectively. 
The relatively low share of domestic securities in Croatia can be explained by the 
Croatian domestic bond market having been relatively underdeveloped, with the 
government massively relying on external financing in the past. However, supply of 
domestic debt notably increased after 2010, leading to an increase in the share of 
5 Bechtel, Eisenschmidt and Ranaldo (2019) show that banks swap sovereign debt securities for reserves.
6 Pillar 2 refers to bank-specific requirements imposed by the supervisor in addition to the generally applica-




























































44 (2) 179-201 (2020)
187domestic sovereign securities in banks’ balance sheets. Also, there were changes in 
asset-liability (A/L) requirements that led Croatian banks to reduce exposure to 
foreign debt securities, while Regulation (EU) no 575/2013 also motivates banks in 
Croatia to hold more domestic debt. As for Slovenia, the low share of domestic debt 
is mostly the result of a substantial increase in euro area securities in bank balance 
sheets in 2007, when Slovenia joined the euro area. 
Thus, we can conclude that there is a clear case of home bias in CEE countries 
(see also Gereben, 2016). As Horváth, Huizinga and Ioannidou (2015) stress, 
home bias can be either voluntary or involuntary. In our view, home bias in CEE 
can be explained by both factors, as banks’ decisions on the structure of debt secu-
rities portfolio depend on the level of development (size and liquidity) of domestic 
bond market, supranational and national regulations, supply of domestic debt, 
monetary policy instruments7, yield differentials etc. 
Figure 4












Hungary RomaniaPoland Czechia Bulgaria Croatia Slovenia
2006-2008 2009-2012 2013-2018 Average
Slovakia
Source: ECB SDW.
In the methodological part of the analysis, presented in the next section, we use 
data on total sovereign debt securities held by banks, as we do not expect that split-
ting the bond holdings into the domestic and the euro area part will affect results 
due to pronounced dominance of domestic bond holdings in most countries8. 
7 For example, the Hungarian National Bank announced a new interest swap facility in April 2014 that was 
designed to provide incentives to Hungarian banks to hold additional domestic public debt.
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188 4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Having shown that banks in the CEE region are strongly exposed to sovereign 
debt, in this section we turn to the question of what drives their appetite for debt 
securities. We focus on various fiscal, economic and regulatory determinants 
important for understanding sovereign exposures in CEE countries. 
4.1 DATA
As mentioned above, our sample includes eight Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries – Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slova-
kia, and Slovenia. Due to limited data availability, the time dimension of our sam-
ple includes quarterly data from Q1 2006 to Q4 2018. To make our methodologi-
cal approach more clear, in this subsection we group data in three main categories, 
dependent variable, main explanatory variables and control variables (graphical 
representation of control and explanatory variables is presented in the Appendix). 
The dependent variable in our analysis is the yearly change in sovereign debt 
securities, calculated from ECB SDW data. As previously noted, debt securities 
are defined according to ESA 2010 methodology (AF.3) and we use total debt 
securities (domestic and euro area) held by banks. 
Choice of our explanatory variables is based on the conceptual framework pre-
sented in Section 2. Following the literature cited in this paper we investigate 
which of the most common theories on banks’ motivation for holding government 
debt can explain sovereign exposure in CEE countries. 
To test the deficit absorption hypothesis, we use data on fiscal deficit (fiscal bal-
ance multiplied by -1) as a share of GDP, retrieved from Eurostat9. According to 
this hypothesis, rising deficits lead to higher financing needs and thus to a higher 
supply of government debt on domestic markets. In such circumstances banks act 
as “buyers of last resort” (Gros, 2017) or residual buyers of government debt 
ESRB (2015). To test the robustness of our results in the analysis we change defi-
cit figures with change in public debt (obtained from Eurostat) as a proxy of deficit 
developments.
Next, we test the reach-for-yield hypothesis, based on data on yields on ten-year 
domestic government bonds, retrieved from Eurostat (convergence criteria inter-
est rates). Higher yields are attractive for banks because they can improve their 
PNLs (profit and loss statements) and interest margins, especially if yields are 
higher than suggested by macroeconomic fundamentals as in such situation there 
is no real trade-off between risk and return (Altavilla, Pagano and Simonelli, 
2016; Lamas and Mencia, 2018). As we use data on yields on domestic govern-
ment bonds we also indirectly test the potential carry trade behaviour of CEE 
banks as these banks have access to favourable funding on core euro area markets, 
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189which could have been used for investments in relatively high-yield bonds in 
some CEE countries, especially during the crisis. To test the robustness of our 
results and gain a better understanding of bank behaviour, in our models we 
change yields with spreads calculated over a German ten-year government bench-
mark bond yield, also obtained from Eurostat.
As for the lack of opportunities hypothesis, we use data on lending to the corporate 
sector as an indicator of the main alternative investment opportunity for banks. 
More precisely, we use data on yearly changes in loans to non-financial corpora-
tions from ECB SDW. If there is falling demand for corporate loans, banks will be 
motivated to invest more in sovereign debt (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2018). Also, the 
relation between changes in sovereign debt securities and corporate loans can pro-
vide some insights into the lazy bank hypothesis (Shetta and Kamaly, 2014).
The Regulatory “arbitrage” hypothesis and the flight to safety hypothesis indicate 
that banks are motivated to invest in sovereign debt in order to improve their 
capital adequacy ratios, which is mostly pronounced during a crisis (Acharya and 
Steffen, 2015; Rocamora, 2018). Thus, we expect a positive relation between 
CAR and sovereign debt securities. Data on CAR are obtained from IMF Finan-
cial Soundness Indicators Database10. 
Finally, according to ESRB (2015) and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018) GDP develop-
ments, as an indicator of broader macroeconomic conditions, can have notable 
effect on bank behaviour. During expansions, fiscal deficits are low and demand 
for private credit is strong, which demotivates banks from investment in sovereign 
debt securities. On the other hand, negative GDP growth rates during recessions 
are strongly related to higher deficits and lower demand for private credit, which 
can motivate banks to increase their exposure to sovereign. Thus, in our analysis 
we use calendar-adjusted GDP growth rate from Eurostat to investigate the effects 
macroeconomic conditions on banks’ investment in sovereign debt securities. 
However, as GDP growth rate is strongly related to deficits and demand for pri-
vate credit, we do not include these variables in same models. 
Finally, as regulators monitor sovereign exposures, as an indicator of the level of 
exposure we include data on the share of sovereign debt securities in the previous 
period. Here we expect that higher exposures in the previous period should reduce 
the growth rate of sovereign securities in banks’ balance sheets. We treat this var-
iable as a key control variable in our models.
A description of data and sources, along with expected effects of all explanatory 
variables on dependent variable, is presented in Table 1.
10 We could not retrieve methodologically comparable data on capital adequacy ratios for all quarters in some 
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190 Table 1 
Data description
























Rise in deficit increases 
financing needs of the 
government, which 
leads to higher supply 
of government bonds.
Yields
Spreads % Eurostat +
Higher yields on local 
government bonds 











Banks are motivated to 








Rising of corporate 
loans indicates that 
banks see investment 
opportunities in private 
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Stronger GDP growth 
has positive effect on 
demand for loans from 
private sector, i.e. 
during expansions 




variables Exposure % Eurostat –
Higher exposure to 
sovereign debt in 
previous period reduces 
the absorption capacity 
for additional sovereign 




Most empirical papers that focus on determinants of banks’ sovereign exposure 
use bank-level micro data for the country of interest (e.g. Lamas and Mencia, 
2018; Gomez-Puig, Singh and Rivero, 2019). In this paper we follow an alterna-
tive approach presented in Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018) where authors use country-
level panel regressions to investigate the determinants of banks’ government debt 
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191differs in having a broader selection of explanatory variables11 and a focus on a 
relatively homogenous group of countries.
Before selecting the appropriate model, we employed several identification tests12. 
According to the Lagrangian multiplier test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) a random 
effects estimator was not appropriate, while the F-test for fixed effects model con-
firmed that the fixed effect model is suitable for our data. Additionally, F-test 
(Torres-Reyna, 2010) showed that time effects are significant so they were 
included in the model. Such an approach is also appropriate as the number of time 
periods (46) in our analysis is larger than the number of cross-section units (8) 
(Kiviet, 1995). 
We estimate a fixed effects model of the following form:
 yi,t = αi + βXi,t + δZi,t + γt + ∈i,t ; i = 1, ... 8, t = 2007q1, ... 2018q2 (1)
where yi,t is the dependent variable, Xi,t includes the main explanatory variables, Zi,t 
represents the vector of control variables, αi are country fixed effects, γt time 
effects and ∈i,t is an error term.
In order to obtain robust estimates, we employed tests for serial correlation, con-
temporaneous correlation across units and group-wise heteroscedasticity. The 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data confirmed first order autocorrela-
tion within units. According to the Breusch-Pagan test for cross-sectional inde-
pendence in the residuals of a fixed effects regression model (Baum, 2001), the 
null of cross-sectional independence was rejected, while the modified Wald test 
for unit-based homoscedasticity in the residuals of a fixed effects regression model 
(Baum, 2001) rejected the null of homoscedasticity across units. To control for all 
the above issues, we employed ordinary least square (OLS) estimates with panel 
corrected standard errors proposed by Beck and Katz (1995), therefore addressing 
heteroscedasticity across panels, contemporaneous correlation across panels and 
autocorrelation within panels. This estimator proved to have acceptable properties 
in longitudinal panels when T > N.
5 RESULTS
In this section we present the results of panel analysis. The estimation results are 
presented in Table 2. Here we present the results of our baseline specifications and 
robustness tests, while additional robustness tests are presented in the Appendix.
11 As main explanatory variables Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018) use T-bill interest rates, real GDP growth, infla-
tion, nominal exchange rate, public debt and several indicators of the level of financial development (as they 
base the analysis on heterogeneous sample of countries).
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192 Table 2
Estimation results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deficit




   3.300***    3.300***
(0.719) (0.719)
Yield
 0.0688 0.559 0.328
(0.838) (0.993) (0.991)
Spread




   -0.0251**    -0.0251**    -0.0260**    -0.0260**
 (0.0119)  (0.0119)  (0.0125)  (0.0125)
GDP 
growth




   0.277***    0.277*** 0.175 0.175   0.226**   0.226**
 (0.0969)  (0.0969) (0.109) (0.109) (0.106) (0.106)
Exposure 
(lagged)
   -1.716***    -1.716***    -1.316***    -1.316***    -1.740***    -1.740***
(0.324) (0.324) (0.354) (0.354) (0.394) (0.394)
_cons
12.10 11.83 13.45 11.22 20.57** 21.89**
(8.382) (7.903) (9.146) (8.599) (10.44) (9.876)
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 286 286 286 286 286 286
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors.
Regarding the deficit absorption hypothesis our results indicate that there is a 
positive and statistically significant relation between deficit and change in debt 
(proxy for deficit) and growth of debt securities in all model specifications, mean-
ing that the supply of sovereign debt securities is an important determinant capa-
ble of explaining the exposure of banks in the CEE region to sovereign debt. On 
the other hand, coefficients that show the relationship between yields and spreads 
and growth in debt securities have the expected sign, but they are not statistically 
significant. Such results suggest that bank behaviour in CEE in this respect cannot 
be explained by the reach-for-yield and/or the carry trade hypothesis. Relation 
between growth of private sector loans and growth of debt securities is negative 
and statistically significant in all specifications, meaning that these instruments 
can be understood as substitutes and that banks tend to invest less in sovereign 
debt securities when there is a demand for private loans. Thus, we can conclude 
that the lack of opportunities hypothesis contributes to the understanding of sov-
ereign exposure in CEE region. This result is also supported by statistically sig-
nificant and negative effect of GDP growth on the dependent variable, meaning 
that during economic expansions, when there is solid demand for private credit, 
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193the deficit absorption hypothesis, as stronger economic growth implies lower pub-
lic deficits and thus a lower supply of government bonds on the market. Statisti-
cally significant effects of GDP growth on sovereign debt securities growth in 
bank balance sheets support the view that macroeconomic conditions have a nota-
ble effect on sovereign exposure in CEE. Finally, there is a a positive and statisti-
cally significant relation between capital adequacy ratio and debt securities 
growth, which indicates that bank exposure to sovereign debt in the CEE region 
can be, at least partially, explained by the regulatory “arbitrage” and/or the flight 
to safety hypothesis.
To test the robustness of our results we conducted several adjustments to our base-
line model specifications. First, as already noted, we used change in public debt 
and spreads as proxies for fiscal deficit and yields, respectively. Also, by including 
GDP growth we additionally tested the credibility of results related to the effects of 
fiscal deficit and loans to the private sector. These changes did not affect the main 
results, as was shown in the above table. Next, we excluded yields and spreads 
from the analysis, as the effects of these variables are not statistically significant. 
Exclusion of these variables did not have a significant effect on the main results. In 
addition, we estimated models only on the sample of non-euro area countries (i.e. 
excluding Slovenia and Slovakia) and only on the sample of inflation-targeters (i.e. 
excluding Bulgaria and Croatia). The results of these robustness tests, presented in 
the Appendix, show that our main results did not change notably.
6 CONCLUSIONS 
In an attempt to reveal new insights into the determinants that contribute to high 
shares of sovereign debt in banks’ balance sheets in the CEE region, we show that 
the level of development plays an important role in the explanation of differences 
between the sovereign exposures of banks in CEE countries and those of other EU 
and euro area members. Sovereign debt securities seem to have a more important 
role in the financial systems of less developed countries, which strongly affects the 
behaviour of both the government and banks themselves. We also found evidence 
of home-bias in CEE countries, which poses a challenge for regulators. As for dif-
ferences in sovereign exposure among CEE countries, we showed that banks in IT 
countries tend to have higher shares of sovereign debt securities in their balance 
sheets than (quasi-)peggers (Bulgaria and Croatia) as these financial instruments 
are used for repo operations, which are the key policy instrument in IT countries.
Our empirical results indicate that changes in bank holdings of debt securities in 
CEE countries are mostly affected by the broader macroeconomic conditions that 
determine fiscal balances and demand for credit in the private sector. As our sam-
ple is marked by recession in most CEE countries, we can conclude that such a 
negative economic environment has significantly contributed to the increasing 
share of sovereign debt securities in banks’ balance sheets. We also found a posi-
tive relation between capital adequacy ratios and changes in sovereign debt secu-
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194 their capitalization indicators, especially during crisis periods. Finally, we did not 
find evidence of reach-for-yield and/or carry trade behaviour of banks in CEE. 
However, since our results are based on country-level data, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that some banks have been engaged in such trades. 
These empirical findings bring us to a slightly provocative conclusion (in light of 
current high-level discussions) that regulators alone have fairly limited power 
over sovereign exposures in CEE countries because these exposures mostly 
depend on broader macroeconomic and fiscal conditions. Thus, all future efforts 
to reduce sovereign exposure in CEE countries require strong collaboration among 
the many stakeholders. These include the regulators, which can impose stricter 
regulations and/or monitoring of sovereign exposures on the national level (as 
Czechia), the fiscal authorities, that should pursue a prudent and counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy, and other policy makers that can contribute to the development of 
financial markets in this region. Diversified investment opportunities, solid credit 
demand from the private sector and a prudent counter-cyclical fiscal policy would 
probably demotivate banks from hoarding sovereign debt securities in their bal-
ance sheets. In addition, as well as ensuring that the regulatory framework does 
not strongly favour government bonds, regulators should focus on reducing the 
home-bias in CEE. 
Finally, for better understanding of the level and determinants of exposure of 
financial systems in CEE to sovereign debt, future research should be extended to 
include other types of debt instruments (primarily loans to government and SOEs) 
and non-banking financial institutions, primarily pension funds and insurance 
companies. Instead of on countries, the analysis could also be done on CEE banks.
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Figure a1
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198 APPENDIX 2 
Figure a2



















t-test for difference of two means (non-IT vs IT)
t-Test: Two-sample assuming unequal variances  
Mean (%) 7.6 13.6
Variance (%) 0.05 0.20
Observations 103 311
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.00  
df 350  
t Stat -17.93  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.00  
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199APPENDIX 3: RESULTS OF ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Table a3.1
Estimation results (yields and spreads excluded)
(1) (2) (3)
Deficit 1.763***(0.257)




















Country Fe YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES
N 286 286 286
Standard errors in parentheses.
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200 Table a3.2
Estimation results (Slovenia and Slovakia excluded)












































































FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 219 219 219 219 219 219
Standard errors in parentheses.
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201Table a3.3
Estimation results (Bulgaria and Croatia excluded)












































































FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 227 227 227 227 227 227
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors.
